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There Is No Bank Lending Channel! 
 
 
       
By Luka Bajec and Johann Graf Lambsdorff
1 
 





The  bank  lending  channel  (BLC)  has  found  entrance  into  standard  economic 
textbooks. But the approach, as presented by Bernanke and Blinder [1988] operates 
with  lopsided  loan  demand,  money  demand  and  money  supply  functions.  This 
invalidates the idea that potential changes in the supply of loans may impact on 
aggregate demand for goods and services. Above, a reduction of loans may restrict 
an individual investors, but the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that 




                                                 
1 Johann Graf Lambsdorff is Professor of Economic Theory at the University of Passau. Luka Bajec is 
research assistant and PhD-candidate at the University of Passau.   2 
I. Introduction 
 
How  monetary  policy  impacts  on  real  aggregates  is  still  a  hotly  debated  issue. 
Economists have identified several channels of monetary transmission. The bank lending 
channel (BLC) has found its place in standard economic textbooks – but it does not exist.  
 
In the credit view two channels are central. Here, we neglect the balance sheet channel, 
which  we  consider  to  be  plausible  and  well  accepted  in  the  literature,  and  focus  our 
analysis on the BLC, which was developed by Bernanke and Blinder in 1988. The BLC, 
as discussed in the literature, stresses the importance of potential changes in the supply of 
loans as a result of monetary policy and a subsequent impact on aggregate demand for 
goods and services, in particular business and residential investments as well as consumer 
durables, [Mishkin 2006: 621]. That is, a tightening monetary policy such as an open 
market sale reduces nonbanks’ deposits at depository institutions (“banks”) and banks’ 
reserves at the central bank. Therefore, banks have fewer funds available to supply loans 
and cut back lending. With borrowers depending on bank loans, investment spending is 
reduced. 
 
In this paper we aim at highlighting seven theoretical facets concerning the BLC that we 
find implausible.  In section II we start by setting the theoretical framework of the BLC – 
mainly according to Bernanke and Blinder. In section III we formulate the critique of the 
BLC. Section IV concludes.  
 
 
II. Bernanke and Blinder’s Bank Lending Channel 
 
Bernanke and Blinder [1988] suggest a simple formal model for illustrating the BLC. The 
private  sector  allocates  its  wealth  between  money  and  (publicly  issued  as  well  as 
corporate) bonds as assets. The private sector’s liabilities consist of bank loans. Due to 
this, banks contribute to the creation of money by issuing deposits and by buying bonds 
from the private sector or issuing loans.  
   3 
The loan demand is  ) , , (
+ + -
º y i L L
d r , where ρ is the interest rate on loans, i is the interest 
rate on bonds and  y  denotes GDP. Ignoring net worth, commercial banks’ balance sheet 
is 
b s R B L D + + = . Thereby, R consists of banks’ reserve requirements,  D t ,  and E, the 
excess reserves at the central bank. 
b B  stands for the bank’s holding of bonds and 
s L  for 
loans.  On  the  liabilities  side  of  the  balance  sheet  D  denotes  deposits.  Bernanke  and 
Blinder disregard currency and central bank loans to commercial banks. Banks’ adding 
up  constraint  can  be  rewritten  as:  ) - = + + t 1 ( D E L B
s b .  The  loan  supply  is 
) - ( =
- +
t r l 1 ( ) , D i L
s ,  assuming  that  structural  changes  of  the  portfolio  are  driven  by 
variations in interest rates of assets. The equilibrium on the loan market is 
(1)  ) - ( = = =
- + + + -
t r l r 1 ( ) , ) , , ( D i L y i L L
s d . 
Bernanke  and  Blinder  implicitly  assume  that  banks  hold  excess  reserves  equal  to 
( , ) (1 E i D e r t = - ),  and  bonds  according  to  ) - =
+ -
t r 1 ( ) , ( D i b B
b .  Assuming  that  the 
positive impact of  r  on 
s L  is as large as its negative impact on 
b B , the adding up 
constraint  suggests  that  the  loan  rate  has  no  influence  on  excess  reserves: 
) - ( =
-
t e 1 ( )D i E .  
 
As can be easily derived, the supply of deposits (money) is equal to bank reserves times 
the money multiplier:  R i m D
s ) (
+ = .
2 The demand for deposits is equal to the demand for 
money in a cashless economy. It is defined as  ) , (
+ -
º y i D D
d . Equating the demand for 
money and the money supply gives 
(2)  R i m y i D ) ( ) , (
+ + -
= .  
The equilibrium on the money market in equation (2) is graphically represented by the 
conventional LM curve. Bernanke and Blinder insert (2) into (1) to obtain an equation for 
the loan market equilibrium 
(3)  ( , , ) , ) ( ) (1
d s L L i y L i m i R r l r t
+ - + - + +
= = = ( - ). 
In words, the equilibrium on the money market in (2) is used to rewrite the loan supply L
s 
and, hence, the equilibrium on the loan market in (3). Bernanke and Blinder make use of 
                                                 
2 From R=tD+εD we obtain D=R/(ε+t). However, Bernanke and Blinder claim the money supplier to be 
[ε(1- t)+t]
-1.  We  assume  Bernanke  and  Blinder  made  a  simple  error  that  is  immaterial  to  the  core 
hypothesis of the paper.   4 
(3) to construct a substitute for the conventional IS curve that includes the loan market 
equilibrium. On the market for goods, the IS curve is rewritten as 
(4) 
- -
= ) , ( r i Y y
3. 
Assuming that dm/di is not too large, (3) can be solved for ρ as an implicit function of i, 
y , and R 
(5)  ) , ,
- + +
( = R y i f r . 
Substituting (5) into (4), we obtain 
(6)  )) , , , ( R y i i Y y ( = f , 
which Bernanke and Blinder label the CC (commodities and credit) curve. Apparently, 










        Figure 1: The BLC 
 
The important point is that monetary policy shifts R in (2) and, hence, not only the LM 
curve but also the CC curve represented in (6). We disagree with the latter statement, but 
we will present our critique in the next section. As a consequence of the policy induced 
shift of the CC curve, expansionary monetary policy affects y  twice because the curves 
shift in the same direction, i.e. outward. The effect on the interest rate is not easy to 
depict. Hence, Bernanke and Blinder [1988: 437] state “[…] that the existence of the 
credit  channel  makes  monetary  policy  more  expansionary  than  in  IS/LM  […]”. 
Consequently, contractionary monetary policy impacts on the LM and CC curve, pushing 
the curves inward and, thus, reducing  y  more than in IS/LM. Figure 2 illustrates this 
aspect. A tight monetary policy operation shifts the CC0 curve to CC1 and the LM0 curve 
to  LM1.  The  resulting  equilibrium  brings  about  yCC.  In  the  textbook  IS/LM  model, 
                                                 
3 In (3) Bernanke and Blinder refer to real interest rates but assume expected inflation to be zero. 
y 
i  LM  CC   5 
contractionary monetary policy shifts only the LM curve inward and the IS curve remains 
unchanged.  We  may  assume  that  CC0  is  shaped  similarly  to  the  IS  curve.  Thus,  in 












           
        Figure 2: Contractionary Monetary Policy 
 
In a less formal approach proponents of the BLC seek to establish a direct link between 
investment  and  consumption  and  the  availability  of  bank  loans,  [Hubbard  1995:  65]. 
Overly high fixed costs to direct financial market participation (as an alternative source of 
funds) are an argument for the existence of bank-dependent borrowers. Thus, small and 
mid-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  have  difficulties  in  issuing  securities  directly  to  the 
financial  market.  In  line  with  Diamond  [1984:  393],  intermediaries  of  the  financial 
system such as banks are capable of reducing the fixed costs of monitoring and therefore 
provide  external  financial  means  particularly  to  SMEs.  Hence,  any  change  in  banks’ 
willingness to lend will influence debtors directly. The bigger the pool of bank-dependent 




The proponents of the BLC also describe circumstances where the suggested transmission 
mechanism is less on work. If a central bank conducts an open market sale, banks are 
                                                 
4 Bernanke and Blinder claim that the BLC becomes particularly visible in a liquidity trap, where the 
interest rate channel is inactive and the LM curve horizontal. We agree with their argument that monetary 
policy remains effective if the interest rate on loans, r, is responding to open market operations. But the 
crucial reason for this monetary effectiveness relates to changing relative prices and is difficult to formally 
relate to changes in the loan supply, as often urged by representatives of the BLC. 
y 
LMo  CCo 
i 
LM1  CC1 
yCC  yIS   6 
affected because they are financed with demand deposits as a reservable form of finance. 
Freixas  and  Rochet  [1997:  165]  argue  that  other  intermediaries  financed  by  non-
reservable  forms,  e.g.  certificates  of  deposits,  commercial  papers  and  long-term  debt, 
cannot be affected by the central banks’ operation although they provide comparable 
services. Therefore, Kashyap and Stein [1993: 14] argue that the BLC is significantly 
weakened if the share of loans provided by banks is small relative to the portion of credit 
supplied by nonbank intermediaries. These could act as “margin lenders”, i.e. provide 
credit when central banks restrict liquidity. This would undermine the central assumption 
of the BLC that central banks have an impact on credit volumes by changing banking 
reserves. We disagree with this argument, but we shall formulate the critique below.  
 
In a nutshell, Mishkin [2006: 621] sums up the BLC:  
“Expansionary  monetary  policy,  which  increases  bank  reserves  and  bank  deposits, 
increases the quantity of bank loans available. Because many borrowers are dependent 
on bank loans to finance their activities, this increase in loans will cause investment (and 
possibly consumer) spending to rise.” 
 
III. Critique of the Bank Lending Channel  
 
The following hypotheses are part of the BLC: 
 
1. Bernanke and Blinder formulate a model that derives from the IS/LM. It includes the 
bank loan market. Bernanke and Blinder [1988: 437] state that “[…] the credit 
channel  makes  monetary  policy  more  expansionary  than  in  IS/LM  […]”.  This 
conclusion is essentially based on the constructed substitute for the IS curve, the 
CC curve. We posit that the tricky construction of this curve obfuscates more than 
it reveals.  
   
2. The BLC as presented by Bernanke and Blinder [1988] is based on a special form of 
the loan demand function. Once employing an alternative version, the development 
of loans is ambiguous, in line with the work of Brunner and Meltzer in the late 
sixties.  
   7 
3. Bernanke and Blinder suggest functions of money demand and money supply which 
are lopsided. We show that a plausible inclusion of the loan rate in the functions 
brings about the textbook IS/LM results. This conclusion is based on the condition 
that  )/2) + r i ((  is on the ordinate.  
 
4.  The  BLC  dismisses  the  logic  of  the  IS  curve  by  claiming  that  loans  constrain 
investments. While this argument appears convincing for an individual investor, the 
macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that such a constraint is not binding.  
 
5. We see some stock-flow problems with deposits, loans and investment Bernanke and 
Blinder use in their explanation of the BLC. Bernanke and Gertler [1995: 40] give 
following explanation: “Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model of the bank lending 
channel suggested that open market sales by the Fed, which drain reserves and 
hence deposits from the banking system, would limit the supply of bank loans by 
reducing banks’ access to loanable funds. […] [A] reduction in the supply of bank 
credit […] is likely […] to reduce real activity. ” 
  While we admit that the stocks of loanable funds deteriorate this cannot be easily 
linked  to  the  flow  of  annual  investments.  Particularly  in  a  liquidity  trap,  the 
proponents of the BLC accentuate the impact on the real economy only by taking 
stock adjustments into consideration.           
  Additionally,  even  in  the  liquidity  trap,  spending  is  not  affected.  Once  the  real 
economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, our next critique implies that even in case of an 
active BLC, which would enable central banks to influence banks’ loan supply, 
monetary policy is impotent in affecting the investment demand. Only if one takes 
relative prices into consideration, investment spending decreases with respect to the 
lifted interest rate. 
 
6. If a central bank conducts an open market sale, banks are affected because they are 
financed with demand deposits. Kashyap and Stein [1993: 14] argue that the BLC 
might be significantly weakened because nonbank intermediaries, who are financed 
by  non-reservable  forms  such  as  certificates  of  deposits  or  commercial  papers, 
could  act  as  “margin  lenders”.  We  deviate  from  this  view  because  nonbanks 
intermediaries cannot act as “margin lenders” due to the fact that they are also 
affected by an open market sale, perhaps even more than banks.     8 
  
7.  Bernanke  and  Gertler  [1995:  41]  explain  that  the  BLC  is  weaker  if  banks  find 
alternative sources for funding and this is the reason for the recent weakening of the 
BLC. From the macroeconomic point of view, we find this argument implausible. 
 
 
Subsequent to the presented hypotheses, we formulate our critique on the model.  
 
1. The CC Curve is Not an Adequate Representation of the IS Curve 
 
In the presented model of Bernanke and Blinder, equation (3) is the starting point of our 
critique. When Bernanke and Blinder replace D for  ( ) m i R , they insert elements from the 
money market equilibrium into the loan market equilibrium. The CC curve thus does not 
solely refer to the loan market. A simpler version for constructing the CC curve would 
arise by inserting money demand into equation (1):  
(1’)  ( , , ) , ) ( , )(1
d s L L i y L i D i y r l r t
+ - - - + + +
= = = ( - ). 
Equation (1’) represents the equilibrium on the loan market, including the condition that 
banks can only supply loans proportional to the deposits that are demanded by the private 
sector. Given that the interest rate negatively impacts on D (instead of a positive impact 
on  ( ) m i R ) the implicit impact of i on r is larger than that in equation (5). We obtain 
instead: 









Inserting (5’) into (4) we obtain  
(6’)  ( , ' , )) y Y i i y f = ( . 
This IS-type of curve is flatter than the CC-curve. In Figure 4 this curve is shown. Since 
it is closer to the original IS-curve, we keep this notation here. Evidently, central bank 














       
Figure 4: Avoiding the Tricky CC Curve   
 
Therefore,  contractionary  monetary  policy  changes  R  and  shifts  only  the  LM  curve 
inwards as depicted by equation (2). The outcome is the well-known result. There is no 
additional  shift  of  the  IS  curve;  monetary  policy  is  not  more  contractionary  than  in 
IS/LM.  
 
2. Testing an Alternative Form of the Loan Demand Function  
 
Bernanke  and  Blinder  [1988]  operate  with  the  bank  loan  demand  function 
) , , (
+ + -
º y i L L
d r .  What  is  problematic  about  this  specification?    Due  to  the  nonbanks 
budget  constraint,  money  demand  and  loan  demand  implicitly  determine  the  bond 
demand, 
p B : The demand function for bonds plus that for money minus loan demand 
must equal total financial wealth, [Bernanke and Blinder 1988: 436]. But open market 
sales by the central bank are missing in this constraint. The central bank is not assumed to 
provide lending facilities to banks (note that such a position is missing in the bank’s 
adding up constraint). The only possibility to carry out central bank policy is by selling 
and  buying  bonds  from  nonbanks,  [Abel  and  Bernanke  2004:  544].  An  open  market 
purchase is similar to a loan by the central bank to nonbanks. The private sector therefore 
regards such a purchase as a substitute to bank’s loans. Likewise, an open market sale is 
similar to a reduction of central bank loans to the private sector. Nonbanks may substitute 
this by increasing loans demanded from banks. 
If  we  add  up  the  constraints  of  the  central  bank  ( D D e t + = R )  and  private  banks 
( ) - = + + t 1 ( D E L B
s b ),  we  obtain:   
b s B L R D + + = .  Assuming  that  the  amount  of 
y 
i  LM  CC 
C 
IS   10 
bonds is given by the treasury, 
b p B B B = + , and accepting that all sector’s constraints 
must  add  up  to  zero,  we  observe  that  the  nonbanks  adding  up  constraint  must  be: 
d p B L D R B + = - + .  Thus,  implicitly  Bernanke  and  Blinder  must  assume  that  the 
nonbank’s bond demand is:  
(7)  ( , ) ( , , )
p B B D i y L i y R r
- + - + +
= - + + . 
Such a demand function is unusual. It requires that the private sector absorbs any open 
market operations by simply adding financial resources offered by the central bank, R, to 
its desired holdings of bonds. But financial resources provided by the central bank may 
rather be regarded as a substitute to loans. This may be particular convincing if central 
bank operations include repurchase agreements.  In this case, bond demand should be 
taken as the starting point for modeling the demand side. We may defined bond demand 
as  
(8)  ( , , )
p B B i y r
+ - +
º  and determine loan demand from the adding-up constraint: 
(9)    ( , ) ( , , )
d L D i y B i y R B r
- + - + +





A reduction of reserves R then raises the loan demand L
d. Indeed, this is the version of a 
loan  demand  function  portrayed  in  Jarchow  [2003:  133]  instead  of 
+ + -
º ) , , ( y i L L




An open market sale (R decreases) leads to an increase in loan demand. At the same time, 
loan supply decreases due to an upward shift of i. The reaction of loans to a reduction of 
R  would  thus  be  ambiguous.  Interestingly,  Brunner  and  Meltzer  came  to  the  same 
conclusion, [Brunner and Meltzer 1966: 163; Brunner 1974 and Brunner and Meltzer 
1968]. The equilibrium level of loans increases only if money demand reacts sufficiently 
strong to the increasing interest rate.   
 
The  impact  of  R  on  r  in  equation  (5’)  becomes  even  stronger  now.  In  reaction  to  a 
decreasing R the downward drop of the IS curve in an (i/Y)-diagram is therefore more 
                                                 








by Bernanke and Blinder. 
6 As argued, this loan demand function assumes that loans and central bank open market purchases are 
perfect substitutes. If we assume that the resources provided by the central bank imperfectly substitute 
bonds and loans, the resulting loan demand function will be some mixture of equation (9) and the loan 
demand in equation (1).    11 
pronounced. An increase in r results due to an increased loan demand. This argument 
seems  to  strengthen  the  point  by  Bernanke  and  Blinder,  but  it  is  in  contrast  to  the 
description of the BLC. Bernanke and Blinder [1988: 437] state, in contrast to Brunner 
and  Meltzer,  that  the  inclusion  of  the  credit  market  makes  monetary  policy  more 
powerful because a central bank affects the real economy by changing the interest rate 
and the loan volume. The second line of argument, however, is now no longer warranted. 
Thus, Bernanke and Blinder’s shift of the IS curve is not well related to their argument of 
changes in R.  
 
 
3. Money Demand and Money Supply are Lopsided 
 
Having  observed  that  r increases  in  response  to  an  open  market  sale,  we  must  now 
address the particular form of the money demand function employed,  ) , (
+ -
º y i D D
d . The 
standard argument for an influence of the interest rate relates to the opportunity costs of 
holding money and to portfolio considerations. But these arguments would relate not only 
to the interest rate on bonds, i, but equally to the interest rate on loans, r. Nonbanks’ 
costs of holding money increase with dearer bank loan. Thus, r reduces money demand 
financed  by  credit.  Put  differently,  an  increase  in  r  enhances  net  credit 
) (
d p L B - provided by nonbanks and reduces money demand. An adequate modification 
would thus include the influence of r:  ( , , )
d D D i y r
- - +
º . The same argument relates to the 
money multiplier. Banks have reason to reduce their reserves when loans are profitable. 
Thus, money supply is positively related to the interest rate on loans, r:  ( , )
s D m i R r
+ +
= . 
The money market equilibrium is represented by:  
(2’) ( , , ) ( , ) D i y m i R r r
- + - + +
= .  
Apparently, a reduction of R may not only be balanced by an increase in i but also by a 
higher r.  In an (i/Y)-diagram a higher r would shift the LM curve downward.  
 
With the many additional shifts of curves as a result of the modifications it becomes 
arduous to draw straightforward conclusions from the model. A core reason is the choice 
of the graphical presentation with the interest rate on bonds, i, on the ordinate. The IS   12 
curve in its conventional logic represents the goods market’s reaction to overall finance 
conditions as determined by the money market. These conditions embrace both interest 
rates, i and r. Assuming for simplicity that loans and bonds are equally important for the 
goods market, equation (4) could be written as  ( ) ( ) 2 y Y i r
-
= + . This would allow to 
portray the model in a (i+r)/Y-diagram. Assuming also that interest rates for loans and 
bonds are equally important for the money market, we can simplify the money market 
equilibrium: 
(2’’)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2, 2 D i y m i R r r
+ - +
+ = + . 
The LM curve obtains the standard positive slope with only R having an impact on its 
position.  In  essence,  we  end  up  with  a  simple  IS/LM-model  in  a  (i+r)/Y-diagram. 
Equilibrium on the loan and bond market are automatically obtained once IS and LM 
intersect. To see this, it suffices to insert the bond demand (8) and the loan demand 
function (9), corrected for  ( ) ( ) 2, D D i y r
+ -
= + , into the nonbank’s adding up constraint: 
( , )
d p B L B R D m i R r
+ +
+ - + = =  to see that this results in the money market equilibrium. 
Therefore, once the IS/LM-equilibirium has been achieved with an equilibrium value for 
( ) 2 i r + , the individual values for i and r are determined so as to balance the loan and 
the bond market.  
 
4. The Logic of the IS Curve has been Missed 
 
Any investment automatically creates the savings that are necessary for its execution. 
This is the macroeconomic logic of the IS curve. Any additional investment leads to 
increased private income. This might be saved. If it is consumed, a multiplier effect leads 
to increased income elsewhere until all of the initial impact is saved. This logic remains 
intact  if  part  of  the  incomes  leads  to  increased  taxation,  because  in  this  case  public 
savings  increase.  Even  in  open  economy  the  logic  of  the  IS  curve  remains  intact. 
Increased income may raise imports; these in turn increase capital imports, which are 
foreign savings.  
 
The BLC dismisses this logic by claiming that loans constrain investments. While this 
argument appears convincing for an individual investor, the macroeconomic logic of the   13 
IS curve suggests that such a constraint is not binding. Macroeconomically, a reduced 
bank loan supply is not a precondition for a reduction of investment. A firm might find 
itself restricted from bank credit and therefore not able to realize investment projects. On 
an  aggregated  level,  investment  might  be  affected  only  on  condition  that  savings 
decrease. But even this sequence is not in line with the aforementioned logic of the IS 
curve, which explains how investment generates savings necessary for its realization.           
 
5. Stock-Flow-Problems  
 
Bernanke and Gertler [1995: 40] explain: 
“Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model of the bank lending channel suggested that open 
market  sales  by  the  Fed,  which  drain  reserves  and  hence  deposits  from  the  banking 
system, would limit the supply of bank loans by reducing banks’ access to loanable funds. 
[…] [A] reduction in the supply of bank credit […] is likely […] to reduce real activity. ” 
 
Deposits are a stock variable: Reducing deposits by conducting tight monetary policy 
means reducing a stock, a variable expressed at a certain moment in time. In contrast, a 
flow variable is defined in units of time. Investment, savings and loanable funds are flow 
variables, but deposits and loans are stocks.  
 
By analyzing balance sheet adjustments to an open market sale, stocks such as deposits or 
supply of loans reduce  and complete the balance sheet adjustments. That is, an open 
market  sale  reduces  nonbanks’  deposits  and  bonds  on  the  asset  side.  With  deposits, 
banks’  liabilities  shrink.  Then,  banks  reduce  the  supply  of  loans,  which  is  also 
documented  on  the  nonbanks’  liabilities  side.  With  less  provided  loans,  nonbanks’ 
deposits are diminished.
7 This is how the balance sheet adjusts to an open market sale. 
But,  there  is  no  necessity  that  investment  as  a  flow  variable  shrinks  in  response  to 
decreased loans.  
 
If money holding is attractive in comparison with investments in other assets due to a low 
interest rate level, nonbanks demand loans to hold deposits and not to bind borrowed 
money in investment projects. Likewise, an open market sale conducted by a central bank 
reduces deposits and hence loans to nonbanks. Nonbanks may adjust their investments in 
                                                 
7 Here, we ignore that it remains blur how loans develop, as criticized in section III.2.   14 
reaction to changing interest rates. But the joint reaction of reduced loans and lowered 
deposits has no straightforward impact on investments.  
 
6. Open Market Sale Also Affects Nonbank Intermediaries 
 
In less formal approaches advocates of the BLC exclude, e.g., certificates of deposits and 
other funding possibilities on the bank’s liabilities side from the theory by assumption, 
[Bernanke and Gertler 1995: 41].
8  If a central bank conducts an open market sale, banks 
are affected because they are financed with the deteriorating demand deposits. Kashyap 
and  Stein  [1993:  14]  argue  that  the  BLC  is  significantly  weakened  if  nonbank 
intermediaries  come  into  play.  These  are  not  financed  by  demand  deposits  and  may 
counteract the diminishing loans supplied by banks. Instead of deposits they are financed 
by non-reservable forms such as certificates of deposits or commercial papers.  
 
We disagree with this argument. BLC proponents disregard that nonbanks’ asset side of 
the  balance  sheet  contains  not  only  deposits  but  also,  e.g.,  certificates  of  deposits  or 
commercial papers. Crucial is that all these assets can be brought into play to reimburse 
the central bank once conducting an open market sale. That is, nonbanks are able to sell 
not only demand deposits but also certificates of deposits or commercial papers to pay the 
bonds  from  the  open  market  sale.  Therefore,  nonbank  intermediaries  financed  by 
commercial papers or certificates of deposits can also be affected by a tight monetary 
policy operation. The central bank influences all intermediaries. The potency of central 
bank’s influence depends on how much each intermediary financed is by the financial 
means which nonbanks primarily sell.  
 
7. Banks’ Alternative Funding  
 
Bernanke and Gertler [1995: 41] explain that the BLC is weaker if banks find alternative 
sources for funding and this is seen to explain the alleged recent weakening of the BLC. 
                                                 
8  The  Modigliani-Miller  theorem,  which  describes  the  irrelevance  of  how  firms  and  banks  finance 
themselves, is not valid any more, if we follow this assumption: Since markets for certificates of deposit are 
not as completely shielded by deposit insurance - thereby increasing monitoring costs - and not as liquid as 
other public markets, Bernanke and Gertler [1995: 41] assume that banks cannot replace lost deposits at no 
cost. That is, Bernanke and Gertler assume that banks can compensate lost deposits with other sources of 
funds. Yet, the replacement of demand deposits with certificates of deposits or with issuing equities, as 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [2003: 33-34] argue, is associated with higher costs.   15 
The  possibility  for  banks  to  issue  certificates  of  deposits  is  a  prominent  example. 
Subsequent to an open market sale, nonbanks could purchase certificates of deposits only 
in exchange for reducing other assets, e.g. deposits. Thus, macroeconomically there are 
no further sources available to banks who seek funding. Hence, all commercial banks in 




IV. Conclusion  
 
The discussion about how central banks transmit monetary impulses to the real economy 
has not come to an end. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by questioning the 
existence of one of the monetary transmission mechanisms, i.e. the bank lending channel, 
and by formulating a critique highlighting seven aspects.  
 
First,  Bernanke  and  Blinder  [1988:  437]  state  that  “[…]  the  credit  channel  makes 
monetary policy more expansionary than in IS/LM […]”. This conclusion is essentially 
based on the constructed substitute for the IS curve, the CC curve. We posit that the 
tricky construction of the CC curve obfuscates more than it reveals. Second, the BLC as 
presented by Bernanke and Blinder [1988] is based on a special form of the loan demand 
function. Once employing an alternative version, the impact of an open market sale on 
loans is ambiguous, in line with the work of Brunner and Meltzer in the late sixties.  
Third, we show that a plausible inclusion of the loan rate in the functions of money 
demand and supply brings about the textbook IS/LM results. This conclusion is based on 
the condition that an average of the interest rates on loans and bonds is on the ordinate. 
Fourth, the BLC dismisses the logic of the IS curve by claiming that loans constrain 
investments.  While  this  argument  appears  convincing  for  an  individual  investor,  the 
macroeconomic logic of the IS curve suggests that such a constraint is not binding. Fifth, 
we  see  some  stock-flow  problems  with  deposits,  loans  and  investment  Bernanke  and 
Blinder use in their explanation of the BLC. While we admit that loans may deteriorate 
this cannot be easily linked to the flow of annual investments. Sixth, if a central bank 
                                                 
9  Certificates  of  deposits  are  not  subject  to  the  reserve  requirement.  Puzzling,  in  a  cashless  world,  as 
assumed by Bernanke and Blinder [1988: 436], funding without reserve requirements could lead to an 
unlimited increase of money because the multiplier increases to infinity. Therefore, the central bank loses 
control of the money stock. But the consequences of such a money supply for the BLC remain unclear. 
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conducts an open market sale, banks are affected because they are financed with demand 
deposits.  But  also  nonbank  intermediaries  are  affected  by  an  open  market  sale.  The 
potency of central bank’s influence depends on how much each intermediary financed is 
by the financial means which nonbanks primarily sell. Seventh, Bernanke and Gertler 
[1995: 41] explain that the BLC is weaker if banks find alternative sources for funding 
and this is the reason for the recent weakening of the BLC. From the macroeconomic 
perspective, we find this argument implausible.   
 
Overall, much of the logic inherent in the BLC resembles that of individual actors, which 
evaporates once considering macroeconomic repercussions and constraints.   17 
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